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HOLISTIC EVALUATION OF REAL-TIME
SAFETY-CRITICAL LARGE-SCALE NETWORKS
Tuncay Bayrak







The growing importance of real-time computing in numerous applications poses problems for network
architectures. This research proposes a model for evaluating safety-critical real-time Wide Area Networks
(WANs), using assessment and performance requirements for highly reliably and dependable real-time
networks, incorporating both human and technical performance criteria.
Keywords:  Computer networks, safety-critical systems, service systems, wide area networks
Research Objectives
Designing, building and evaluating large-scale networks that are always available is a complex, multidimensional problem. In
this context, WANs pose significant performance analysis challenges. First, the execution environment of geographically
distributed wide are networks is far less deterministic than those of locally distributed small-scale networks. Second, large-scale
networks, which contain hundreds of nodes, are highly complex [Shaffer, et al., 1999].
There has been a considerable amount of research in the area of network performance evaluation. However, although much
network evaluation research has been undertaken [Banerjee, et al., 1997], [Niehaus et al., 1997], [DaSilva, et al., 1997],
[Higginbottom, 1998], [Havercort, 1998] little of the research focused on the evaluation of real-time safety-critical WANs.
Examples of such safety-critical wide area networks include intelligent transportation systems (Andrisano et al., 2000), distributed
health care networks (Yamamoto et al., 2000), global oil and gas exploration and research networks (MacIntyre, 1999), and
aviation traffic monitoring systems (Cheng et al., 2000). 
Most large-scale networks depend on hardware, software, and human operators to function correctly. Failure of any of the network
elements can bring the entire network down and in safety-critical settings, the consequences can be disastrous. A well-known
example of such failure is the 1990 nationwide AT&T network failure (Kuhn, 1997). This example is not an isolated one:
according to the Federal Communication Commission (FCC), network failures in the United States with impact on more than
30,000 customers happen on the order of one every two days and the mean time to repair them is on the order of five to 10 hours
(Demeester, et al., 1999). 
A combination of quantitative assessments of a network and qualitative measurements of operators’ performance with a network
is important for understanding relationships between operators and networks and the impact of both on organizational
performance; such an approach is presented by this research.
Performance Evaluation of Real-Time Safety-Critical WANs
Wide Are Networks are complex large-scale systems. Wang & Pham (1997) argue that usually there are four main difficulties
in evaluating complex large-scale system reliability, availability and Mean Time Between Failure (MTBF): the system structure
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may be very complex, subsystems may follow various failure distributions, the failure data of subsystems are not sufficient, and
finally, subsystems may follow arbitrary failure and repair distributions for repairable systems. 
In addition to the well-defined metrics such as response time, throughput, and latency that are used to evaluate networks, Kirner
(1997) focuses on six essential quality requirements for real-time safety-critical systems, which are timing, reliability, safety,
security, usability, and maintainability.
Timing requirements are essential for real-time safety-critical systems because failure to meet timing constraints in such
applications can lead to intolerable system degradation and, in some cases, result in catastrophic loss of life, environment, and
property [Kirner and Davis, 1996a]. Real-time safety-critical systems are subject to unexpected and unpredictable conditions and
circumstances that negatively interfere with their behavior, leading to failure, faults, hazards, and accidents [Kirner and Davis,
1996b]. Failure is a deviation in the expected system behavior. A fault is a causative agent for failure. A hazard is a condition
resulting from failure, and an accident is a hazard that results in unacceptable loss or damage of life, environment, or property
[Kirner and Davis, 1996b].
In order to achieve high integrity levels in complex, real-time, safety-critical systems, it is necessary to detect failures and take
appropriate fault recovery action, to maintain safe system operation or fail to a safe state [Johnson, 1996a]. Safety-critical systems
tend to have reliability requirements ranging from 10-5 to 10-9  over a given time period [Leveson, 1994]. Achievement of this
requires the use of redundancy, the detection of failures with very low probabilities of occurrence, and often immediate response
to the detection of a failure [Johnson, 1996a]. One of the most important considerations associated with designing safety-critical
networks is redundancy. All safety–critical systems rely on some form of redundancy, be it time, data, algorithmic, or structural
(hardware or software) [Profeta III, et al, 1996]. 
Safety is defined as freedom from those conditions that can cause death, injury, occupational illness, or damage to or loss of
equipment or property [Leveson, 1994]. Safety is a system property, not a component property [Leveson et al, 1997]. While
reliability engineering concentrates on component failure accidents, system safety deals with a broader class of accidents including
both component failure and system accidents [Leveson, 2000], which may arise in the interactions among components rather than
the failure of individual components [Perrow, 1984]. Safety is often confused with reliability. Leveson (1994) discusses the
interrelationship between safety and reliability. In general, reliability requirements are concerned with a system failure free,
whereas safety requirements are concerned with making it mishap free.  Kirner (1997) argues that a system can be reliable but
not safe, a system can be both safe and reliable, and a system can be both unsafe and unreliable.
A system is secure if it has the ability to detect, protect itself, and recover from possible inappropriate access involving one or
more of its components, including physical facilities, hardware, software, interfaces, and data [Sennet, 1991]. Varadharajana and
Katsavosa (1997) argue that the fundamental questions that we need to consider when addressing security in high speed WANs
are: a) What are the security threats in the network environment? b) What are the required services and mechanisms? c) Where
should these services and mechanisms be provided in the protocol stack? and d) How are they to be managed? They outline
different types of security threats, including unauthorized disclosure of information, unauthorized modification of information,
masquerading attack, unauthorized access to network resources and services, unauthorized denial of service, and repudiation.
A system is usable if it has appropriate user interface [Day and Boyce, 1993]. Usability is important for real-time safety-critical
systems because poorly designed human computer interfaces may cause system failures. Mayhew (1999) lists the benefits of
usability to users, including increased productivity, decreased user training time and cost, decreased user errors, increased
accuracy of data input and data interpretation, and decreased need for ongoing technical support. 
Maintainability is defined as a measure of the ease and rapidity with which a system or equipment can be restored to operational
status following a failure [http://www.hq.nasa.gov/office/codeq/mtecpage/pm1.pdf][10/05/2000]. 
The metric Mean Time To Repair (MTTR), defined as the average time necessary to troubleshoot, remove, repair, and replace
a failed system component, is often utilized in maintainability measurement. [www.hq.nasa.gov/office/codeq/mtecpage/at2.pdf]
[10/05/2000]. 
Theoretical Model
In safety-critical settings, where network failures can have catastrophic effects and networks provide an important social and
technical infrastructure, utilizing performance criteria that reflect the differing requirements that such networks must meet is
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important [So and Durfee 1996]. For instance, real-time safety-critical WAN’s must meet stringent response, availability,
reliability and accuracy; thus, use of technical performance criteria can provide some measure of the network’s ability to meet
those requirements. Similarly, real-time WAN’s in safety-critical settings must also meet critical communication, decision-
making, problem-solving and organizational effectiveness requirements; as a result, social, psychological and organizational
network performance criteria can also be used to measure the social and organizational effectiveness of the network infrastructure.
Finally, in many cases, real-time WAN’s in safety-critical settings must also satisfy demanding commercial and economic
requirements, as befitting their industrial hosts. Thus, commercial and economic performance criteria can provide measures of
the network’s ability to satisfy its economic and resource requirements. These requirements suggest important performance criteria
for use in evaluating real-time WAN’s in safety-critical settings. In such evaluations, technical, social, organizational,
psychological, commercial and economic evaluation criteria provide a means of measuring the performance of the network, and
of addressing the social, technical and economic challenges faced by real-time WAN’s.
Figure 1.  Real-Time Safety-Critical WAN Evaluation Model
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Figure 1 illustrates the proposed evaluation approach. Three types of performance are of interest in evaluating WANs in real-time
safety-critical settings: the performance of the network P (N); the human performance of those using the network HP (N); and
the performance of the system and organization P (S), as seen in Figure (1). 
As discussed earlier, real-time networks interact with humans, the environment, and other technologies, and interactions between
these different elements may contribute to network failures. Hence, in addition to traditional technical performance considerations,
the proposed model of WAN evaluation deems human factor and environmental considerations crucial in evaluation studies. This
is because human error and acts of nature are among the major sources of failures in networks (Kuhn 1997).
Technical variables (T), such as network reliability, response time and utilization, certainly impact network performance P (N),
as do social, psychological and organizational variables (S), commercial and economic variables (E), or system and environmental
variables (SE) such as hardware failures and software failures, and interactions (IN) between the network and its working
environment (Figure 1). Note that in Figure 1, technical variables (T) also influence commercial and economic variables such as
cost and social, psychological and organizational variables (S), such as accuracy, communication and system usage. These are
indirect effects on network performance P (N), and the impact vectors in Figure 1 for these variables are shown as dotted lines.
In turn, network performance P (N) influences human performance with the network HP (N) as well as the performance of the
system that the network serves P (S). Individual (IH) and group (G) variables such as vigilance and workload, also influence human
performance with the network HP (N), as seen in Figure 1.
Finally, overall system performance for the systems that host real-time WANs is influenced by the performance of a network P(N)
as well as by human performance with the network HP(N).
The model posed also fits with Checkland’s (2002) well-established systemic framework, which proposes  5E's that stands for:
efficiency, efficacy, effectiveness, ethics and aEsthetic. 
Research Methodology
Research Setting and Subjects
To evaluate the Figure 1 model, an empirical evaluation of the proposed model was undertaken. The research setting was a 24
x 7 network operations center where several real-time safety-critical wide area networks are monitored and maintained. The real-
time WAN under study is the Continuous Operational Real-Time Monitoring System (CORMS), which was designed and built
by the U.S. National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA). CORMS’s purpose is to provide a 24 hour/day
monitoring and quality control of water level and meteorological data from around the US to ensure the availability and accuracy
of tide and water current observations that are used for navigation and safety of life and property decisions. CORMS is monitored
in 24 hour/7 day mode by 6 watchstanding operators who monitor CORMS and determine what actions are necessary if the
accuracy of any of the measured parameters is deemed to be questionable (NOAA, 1999).
Since there are three types of performance evaluations proposed by the model, there are three sets of subjects for this research:
the CORMS wide area network for the network performance evaluation, the operators who monitor and utilize the network for
the human performance evaluation, and the host organization (NOAA) for the system performance evaluation. 
Procedure
The network, operator and system performance hypotheses tested in this research are listed in Table 1. The hypotheses, variables,
their operationalizations and measurements are listed in Table 2. Network, operator and system performance were evaluated by
utilizing well-defined and well-known metrics. The appropriate statistical tests and mathematical analyses were run on collected
data, and the results of the mathematical analyses and statistical tests were used to evaluate the hypotheses.
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Table 1.   Hypotheses
Hypothesis Description
Network Performance Hypotheses
H1 Increased use of a real-time WAN will be associated with decreased network reliability, decreased
network accuracy, and increased network response time.
H2 Increased network redundancy will be associated with increased network workload, increased cost,
increased usage, and increased network reliability. 
Operator Performance Hypotheses
H3 Decreased network reliability will be associated with decreased operator satisfaction, decreased operator
confidence, and increased operator workload. 
H4 Increased network usage will be associated with decreased operator vigilance.
H5 An increased number of tasks processed in a real-time network will be associated with decreased operator
accuracy, decreased operator reliability, and decreased operator communication. 
H6 Decreases in operator performance will be associated with decreases in network reliability. 
System Performance Hypothesis
H7 Changes in user perceptions of a network’s contribution to organizational success will be associated with
changes in network reliability.
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b. Operator Performance Hypotheses 
3a: Decreased network
reliability will be associated
with decreased operator
satisfaction.
3b: Decreased network reli-
ability will be associated
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confidence.
3c: Decreased network reli-
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A Mapping Between the Hypotheses and the Six Kirner 1997 Metrics
and the Checkland Five E Metrics
In addition to the types of metrics proposed by the Kirner  (1997) and Checkland  (2002) models, the model incorporates several
other disciplines en route to a holistic evaluation model. Table 3 shows the interrelationships and a mapping between the
hypotheses and the 6 Kirner (1997) metrics, and the Checkland 5 E metrics. Both models provide essential metrics to be heeded
in evaluating complex large-scale information systems. 
Because humans and technology cooperatively perform tasks in network-centered safety-critical large-scale systems in the real
world, the proposed model encompasses both social and technical dimensions. This study provides an example of how those
dimensions might be operationalized in metrics and measurements. Data was gathered from the research sponsor for this study
based on the metrics and measurements listed in Table 2. The research thus provides an example of how the theoretical research
model might be operationalized by LAN and WAN managers. A presentation of the results of the data analysis will be available
at the conference.  
Table 3.  A Mapping between the Hypotheses and the Six Kirner 1997 Metrics
and the Checkland Five E Metrics
Hypothesis # Description Kirner Metric Checkland Metric
H1 Increased use of a real-time WAN will be
associated with decreased network reliability,





H2 Increased network redundancy will be associated
with increased network workload, increased





H3 Decreased network reliability will be associated
with decreased operator satisfaction, decreased
operator confidence, and increased operator
workload. 
Usability Efficiency, Effectiveness
H4 Increased network usage will be associated with
decreased operator vigilance.
Usability Efficiency, Effectiveness
H5 An increased number of tasks processed in a
real-time network will be associated with
decreased operator accuracy, decreased operator
reliability, and decreased operator
communication. 
Usability Efficiency, Effectiveness
H6 Decreases in operator performance will be
associated with decreases in network reliability. 
Usability, Reliability Efficiency, Effectiveness
H7 Changes in user perceptions of a network’s
contribution to organizational success will be
associated with changes in network reliability.
Reliability Efficacy, aEsthetic 
Current Status
The literature review is concluded, and the proposed model, hypotheses, dependent variables, and their operationalizations to
evaluate subjects have been defined. Data analysis is complete and results will be available for conference presentation. 
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